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Momentum is one of the most important anomalies in the financial world, heavily used by 
investors, from hedge funds to individuals. Stock returns have other characteristics, such as 
reversals. This study proposes accounting for that to improve momentum, while also studying 
volatility reduction approaches. The developed model leads to a much higher Sharpe ratio 
and alpha for the US market and lower risk than unrestricted momentum. An improvement 
of this magnitude could affect investors significantly. However, the increase in turnover is 
so large that there is no significant difference in returns to unrestricted momentum after 
monthly trading costs of 1.1%. 















Background and Motivation 
Investment based on historical information poses dazzling challenges to financial theory.  In 
light of market efficiency, these approaches should not yield satisfactory results. However, 
investors have consistently achieved superior performance while using it. 
Among these approaches, one of the most popular is momentum. This self-financing strategy, 
that bets on the best performing stocks of the past against the worst performing, produced 
returns not explained by known risk-factors in several markets. From 1929 to 2016, 
momentum offered annual excess returns of 15.1% on average and a monthly alpha of 1.8% 
for the US market, using an equal-weight scheme for the portfolios (Table 3 and 5). 
Despite being used before him, Richard Driehaus is regarded as “the father of momentum 
investing” for his use and explanation of some extent of the strategy, allowing him to achieve 
annual returns of more than 30% in the 80’s. Various other investors have been reported to 
use momentum, such as George Soros or the world-famous hedge funds Winton Capital and 
AQR. The latter is one of the most prominent defenders of the startegy, with key figures of 
the fund entering the scientific discussion and challenging academics, in papers such as 
Asness et al. (2014).  
During the last decade, momentum’s performance was exceptionally poor. The post-crisis 
period significantly impacted the strategy cumulative returns, with a loss of 84.9% in 2009. 
However, this is not a unique period in history. During the 30’s, momentum performed very 
poorly as well and then it entered a highly profitable long period of time, fueling arguments 






Despite the long-term results, these sudden crashes pose too much of a risk for investors of 
certain risk aversion levels, as they take decades to recover from, shown by Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015). The search for improvements can have significant impact, and allow 
even the most risk averse investors to use momentum, confident that the returns justify this 
level of risk. This master thesis proposes a model that accounts for other characteristics of 
returns, stripping stocks of contradictory signals and improving the selection process. 
Momentum portfolios are formed on the basis that in the medium-term (6 to 12 months) 
stocks will exhibit returns continuation. However, academics have also documented that 
returns suffer a reversal in the short and in the long-term. To address such matter, portfolios 
were created, in which stocks were excluded if there were also signs of reversal.  
Following such practice for short-term reversal signs considerably improves momentum, 
with a Sharpe ratio of 1.08 compared to 0.57 of the unrestricted model, and a monthly alpha 
of 2.6%, according to the Fama-French 3-Factor model, between 1929 and 2016. There is 
also evidence that risk is significantly reduced when looking at other measures such as 
skewness, kurtosis or drawdown. This strategy outperforms unrestricted momentum and the 
market in terms of risk-adjusted returns in 8 out of the 9 decades studied, with considerable 
robustness across time. Since 2009, the strategy underperformed the market, but did far better 
than unrestricted momentum. This thesis does not address the significance of the last decade 
for future prospects of momentum, but it is reasonable to state that if it recovers, then so will 
the enhanced model.  
The impact of transaction costs on these returns was also analyzed.. The evidence shows that 






statistically no different than the ones of momentum, at a 95% level of confidence, for a 
monthly trading cost higher than 1.1%. This means that the value of the study for investors 
could be much more limited. 
The exclusion of long-term reversal signs was also studied, and it is much more difficult to 
attain, as the reversion happens in a long period of time and the tests made did not show 
satisfactory results. 
Finally, the high volatility of momentum was addressed by bringing in the risk-parity concept 
to capital allocation and a volatility screening approach for the winners and losers portfolios. 
These propositions were deemed ineffective in reducing risk, leading to the conclusion that 
momentum’s risk originates from the relation between the winners and losers portfolios, 
rather than from the risk of each of them individually.  
This report is organized with the following structure: Section II provides an overview of the 
already studied and documented characteristics of momentum. Section III is a description of 
the data and variables used. Section IV explains the methodology of this study. Section V 












Momentum was first described academically by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The authors 
tested strategies of pursuing returns continuation over the period of 1965 to 1989 in the US. 
The results based on a 6-month looking-back period and a 6-month holding period, yielding 
12.0% excess return per year, gave birth to one of the most important market anomalies. A 
possible justification proposed by the authors is that momentum returns can be explained by 
underreaction to short-term prospects of the firm. They also report that between 2 to 5 years 
after formation, the returns of portfolios created using momentum tend to revert, which they 
justify due to an overreaction to long-term prospects. 
This longer-term reversal had previously been documented. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
report that from 1926 to 1982 past losers exhibit a cumulative return 25% higher than 
winners, 36 months after portfolio formation. They conclude that these results support the 
idea of overaction to company news. In a follow-up paper (1987), they find that these returns 
are not explained by market risk nor by the size effect. 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman, several academics have written on the topic, searching for 
explanations. Barberies et al (1998), Daniel et al (1998) or Hong and Stein (1999) consider 
that biases on how investors interpret information are the cause of the anomaly, the so called 
behavioral models. Hong and Stein argue that the existence of two groups of traders explains 
momentum: news watchers act on new information about the company but underreact, 
allowing the second group, momentum traders, to explore the rest of the upside, eventually 
creating an overreaction. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) explain it in light of 






(1998) argue that the excess returns of the strategy might simply be a compensation for cross-
sectional differences in mean returns.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) elaborate an analysis of these rationales and find that winner 
stocks are typically larger and have lower B/M than losers, evidencing lower risk according 
to the Fama-French factors. The authors also find evidence supporting the behavior models’ 
explanation. Grundy and Martin (2001) conclude that the returns of momentum cannot be 
justified by dynamic exposure to the Fama-French factors nor to industry effects, and that 
they are driven by stock-specific returns (that is the part of total returns that is not justified 
by exposure to risk factors). 
Some have argued that the abnormal returns are the compensation for sudden crashes of 
around 80% in short periods of time. Grundy and Martin (2001) argued that this is a time-
varying systematic risk and can be hedged using the beta of the strategy itself. Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015) propose a different solution, based on the overall realized volatility of the 
strategy, setting the weight invested in momentum as a function of volatility. 
Throughout the years, momentum has been documented in numerous markets and asset 
classes. Rouwenhorst (1999) shows that the pattern is also present in emerging markets. 
However, Hameed and Kusnadi (2002) conclude that it does not yield satisfactory results in 
Asian Pacific Basin stock markets. Fama and French (2012) provide evidence of momentum 
in several developed countries, finding Japan as the only exception. Moskowitz and Pederson 






Finally, academics have addressed the impact of trading costs and whether these justify the 
abnormal returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) briefly refer to this matter, concluding that 
the returns are resistant to trading costs, which they assume to be around 0.5% per month. 
However, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) propose a more complex model for the 
estimation of these costs and conclude they are much higher, between 1 and 2% for some 
stocks, but between 5 and 9% for others. They argue that the strategy relies mostly on stocks 
with higher transaction costs and conclude that the anomaly is not persistent when accounting 
for those. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) also address the matter, but conclude that some 
momentum strategies are resilient to trading costs. Different academics have considered 
different costs and the debate on this topic is ongoing. 
Departing from the existing research, investors can benefit from a model that accounts for 
some of the characteristics described above, leading to a stronger and more stable 
performance. This thesis investigates if there is an alternative way of screening and weighting 
stocks that could help account for these known trends and improve momentum. 
 
Data  
For this study, data was extracted from the CRSP database regarding prices, holding period 
and delisting returns, stock exchanges and share codes. All stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ were initially considered. 
Data was extracted from December 1925 to December 2016, however the described results 






period and a needed correction on the data1, resulting in a sample of 1055 months. For any 
given month, the return of a stock includes the dividends received, and in case of delisting, 
it takes into account the value of the firm at delisting date. 
Using only stocks with a share code of 10 or 11 (thus, excluding non-ordinary shares and 
others) and a positive market capitalization for the end of month T-1, other variables were 
constructed for each stock based on a looking-back period (to compute these variables for a 
stock, it must have a return for the entire period). For each month T, the continuously 
compounded cumulative returns of the last 12 months were calculated (excluding T-1, and 
therefore only including 11 months). Also, a second set of cumulative returns was calculated 
in the same way, but for the last 36 months (including T-1). The rolling standard deviation 
was computed for month T, using the prior 36 months. 
After building the ranking rules, only stocks with price higher than $5 for the end of T-1 were 
included in the portfolios, thus excluding penny stocks, as in Bhootra (2011).  
Finally, the data used for the final regressions, concerning the risk factors (SMB, HML and 
the market) was extracted from Kenneth French’s data library. 
1 – To include the delisting returns for month T, prices for month T and T+1 must be 0. 
 
Methodology 
In this section, the creation of different strategies will be explained. All calculations leading 






returns using Microsoft Excel and Stata. Additionally, all strategies, stocks used, and 
variables created follow the rules described in the Data section. 
Unrestricted Momentum: 
As a first step, the unrestricted momentum strategy was created. The winners portfolio is 
composed by the 10% stocks with the highest past 12-month cumulative return, skipping T-
1 as previously stated, while the losers portfolio is composed by the 10% stocks with lowest 
cumulative return. Academics, such as Fama and French (1996), had already documented 
that skipping the last month of the cumulative return period improves momentum, arguing 
that a short-term reversal is more likely to be present when this is not done. 
In a given month, the amount invested in the long position (winners) and the short position 
(losers) is the same, to assure the strategy is self-financing. Inside the winners and losers 
portfolios, two schemes of weighting stocks were initially tested. In the first one, stocks are 
value-weighted, using the market capitalization at the end of T-1. In the second, stocks have 
an equal weight. The returns of momentum correspond to the difference between the returns 
of the long position and the ones from the short position. 
These portfolios are a replication of the already existing approach. An equal-weight scheme 
was deemed more effective (as described in the Results section) and will serve as a basis for 
comparison terms, sometimes called unrestricted momentum in other sections of the report.  
Exclusion of 1-month reversal signals:  
As discussed, stocks can suffer two contradictory signals in any given moment. On the one 






cumulative return, which momentum tries to capture. On the other hand, stock prices can 
exhibit a short-term reversal sign if they continued to move considerably in T-1. Thus, 
clearing momentum of stocks that exhibit these signs should improve the selection process, 
resulting in a superior performance.  
Although skipping the last month had already been documented, this means we would not 
account for it. The proposition in this study is that we can account for it, and exclude stocks 
that are more likely to suffer a reversal, rather than “leaving it to luck”.  
To do so, a new portfolio of winners was constructed by taking the 10% stocks with highest 
cumulative return from T-12 to T-2, as before, but all stocks that are also in the top 10% from 
T-11 to T-1 are excluded. Similarly, a new portfolio of losers was constructed by taking the 
10% stocks with lowest cumulative return from T-12 to T-2, but all stocks that are also in the 
bottom 10% from T-11 to T-1 are excluded.  
The rest remains the same as the equal-weighted portfolio and this represents momentum 
cleared of short-term, 1-month, reversal signals. 
Exclusion of 3-year reversal signals: 
Stocks can also suffer a long-term reversion after moving considerably in one direction. This 
has been discussed to happen between 2 to 5 years after portfolio formation and, as before, 
an investor can encounter signs of such reversal together with signs of momentum. 
Working very much in the same way as before, stocks were excluded from the initial winners 
(losers) portfolios if they were also winners (losers) using the cumulative return from T-36 






This portfolio represents momentum cleared of long-term, 3-years, reversal signals. 
Portfolios weighted by risk: 
Several research papers have tried to deal with the high volatility and sudden crashes faced 
by momentum investors. Grundy and Martin (2001) or Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) are 
examples of that. However, the study has been focused on searching for a hedging/allocation 
strategy to momentum investing that would correct that risk. The proposition in this thesis is 
different, it is an attempt at finding screening and weighting rules at portfolio formation that 
allow for a reduction in volatility, rather than a post-formation rule. 
The first attempt builds on the well-known risk-parity strategy developed by the hedge fund 
Bridgewater Associates, which attempts at weighting stocks by risk. It uses the rolling 
standard deviation to assure that all stocks contribute equally to the risk of the portfolio. The 
idea of bringing this approach to momentum is that if the investor can reduce the volatility 
of the winners and losers portfolio in a separate way, than the volatility of the momentum 
portfolio could also be reduced.  
The selection of stocks is done in exactly the same way as the unrestricted strategy, changing 
only the weight that each stock has (inside the portfolios). 
After calculating the rolling 36-month standard deviation of each stock, this value is used to 















Where 𝑤𝑖 is the weight of each stock inside the portfolio of winners or losers, 
1
𝜎𝑖
 is the inverse 




1  is the sum of all inversed 
volatilities of the included stocks. 
This is a standard risk-parity approach, giving more weight to stocks with lower risk and less 
weight to riskier stocks, and the rolling period follows the example of Asness et al. (2012). 
Momentum portfolios excluding the most volatile stocks: 
The second approach to reduce volatility consists of a simple exclusion of the most volatile 
stocks. The fact that stock returns are characterized by volatility clustering is well known. 
This means that periods of low (high) volatility would be followed by periods of low (high) 
volatility for a given stock. Considering the broad market, one could expect that if volatility 
for each stock is highly correlated with past periods, then the low (high) volatility stocks will 
remain as such. Departing from this idea, the investor who chooses the least volatile stocks, 
could expect them to continue being the least volatile, thus reducing the risk. 
Portfolios are formed in the same way as equal-weighted momentum, but exclude all stocks 
with rolling standard deviation above the median for the past 36 months, maintaining the 
same rolling period of the Risk-Parity approach.  
Other formation rules: 
For all strategies and portfolios, if in any given month there are no stocks that match the 
screening criteria, then the portfolio (of winners or losers) is simply invested in the risk-free 







The average turnover of the strategies (the percentage of the portfolio that is sold each month) 
was computed in the same way as Grundy and Martin (2001). After this, the monthly round-
trip costs that would turn profits insignificantly different from 0 at a 95% level of confidence 
were computed assuming a normal distribution. Also, the level of costs that would turn the 
difference between the returns of unrestricted momentum and of the developed model 
insignificantly different was calculated. 
 
Analysis and Results 
The discussion of the developed tests will take the following structure: Unrestricted 
momentum analysis; Elimination of reversal signals; Volatility reduction mechanisms; Final 
tests and robustness of the model; Transaction costs. Tables 1 to 8 summarize the results 
discussed and can be found in page 21 to 23 of this report. 
Unrestricted momentum: 
A brief analysis of Table 3, for the equal-weighted and value-weighted statistics, allows for 
a confirmation of the already documented characteristics of momentum and provides 
evidence on the superior performance of an equal-weighting scheme.  
An annual excess return of 13.1% on average over the sample period and a Sharpe ratio of 
0.40, confirms the magnitude of the results reported by other studies for the value-weighted 
strategy. Furthermore, the risk exposure analysis shows that these returns are not justified by 






significant at a 99% confidence level, and there is negative exposure to all risk factors, 
meaning it diversifies risk and making momentum a very important anomaly in financial 
markets.  
By comparison, the equal-weighted strategy delivered a much better performance, with an 
annual excess return of 15.1% and a Sharpe ratio of 0.57. In this case, the monthly alpha is 
1.8% and the exposure to the SMB factor is no longer significant, but it still has negative 
exposure to the Market and HML factors. Being so, this weighting strategy was considered 
more effective and serves as a basis for comparison, referred to as unrestricted momentum in 
other parts of the report. 
The results also confirm the high volatility reported in previous studies, with an annual 
standard deviation of 26.6% from 1929 to 2016 (for the equal-weighted portfolio), and the 
tendency for sudden crashes. This is not only confirmed by a very high level of kurtosis 
(21.3) and significantly negative skewness (-2.5), but also by two historical crashes in 1932 
and 2009, in which the strategy lost more than 80%. 
Elimination of reversal signals: 
Clearing momentum of short-term reversal signs produces an increase in Sharpe Ratio to 
1.08, due to a significant increase in excess return. The likelihood of extreme events is much 
lower and the probability of them being negative also decreases considerably, as measured 
by kurtosis and skewness. This supports the hypothesis that accounting for the last month of 
the cumulative return, and using it to exclude stocks that are more likely to enter a reversal 






The strategy developed to exclude stocks with long-term reversion signs does not improve 
momentum. The risk increases significantly when measured in terms of standard deviation 
or in terms of skewness and kurtosis, while the excess return barely changes.  
A possible explanation, that also reconciles the results achieved for short-term reversion, is 
that the latter happens in a short period of time, 1 month, and so, using that month is very 
effective in clearing reversal signals. Long-term reversal happens in a much longer period, it 
is documented to happen between 2 and 5 years after formation. Thus, it is much harder to 
avoid the period in which reversal specifically happens. A more complex strategy of 
excluding stocks could be tested, such has excluding stocks that are winners/losers in any 
cumulative period between 2 and 3 years. However, it would likely result in a selection 
process that does not pick any stocks most of the times. 
Volatility reduction mechanisms: 
The results were not satisfying, as can be seen in Table 3, and did not prove the original ideas. 
None of the approaches has a positive effect on momentum, especially when compared to 
the simple equal-weighted scheme. 
The tests made for the use of a risk-parity approach do not confirm the initial hypothesis, as 
it falls short of improving the equal-weighted momentum (however performing better than a 
value-weighted strategy). The Sharpe ratio of 0.48 is half-way between value-weight and 
equal-weight momentum, and the level of kurtosis and skewness is worse. The higher risk is 






For the volatility screening strategy, the results are slightly worse and again do not confirm 
the hypothesis. Sharpe ratio decreases to 0.44, with lower return and higher volatility. Other 
measures of risk improve slightly, but the performance under the historical crashes is 
inconclusive. 
This shows that attempts to reduce momentum risk at portfolio formation are not effective. 
The conclusion can then be drawn that most of the risk comes from the relationship between 
the winners and losers portfolios, and not from the volatility of each of them individually. 
This means that only rules changing the allocation of capital to momentum can accurately 
reduce risk for investors by timing the strategy better. 
Further analysis and tests: 
Building on the study previously described, the strategy that excludes all stocks remaining in 
the winners/losers portfolio during T-1 was further analyzed to fully understand its benefits.  
The result is a dramatic improvement to momentum. The Sharpe ratio almost doubles to 1.08, 
caused by an increase in average annual excess return from 15.1% to 28.6%. While standard 
deviation remains the same, other measures of risk provide much more encouragement, with 
kurtosis decreasing to 11.3 and negative skewness reduced to -0.7, exhibiting a lower 
tendency to extreme cases, and especially to extreme negative cases. 
This new momentum model achieves a positive and significant alpha both according to the 
CAPM and to the Fama-French 3-Factor model. The analysis made using the latter shows 






(the exposure to the SMB and Market factor is not significant). The results can be 
summarized in the following equations (significance levels in Table 5): 
Unrestricted model: 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 = 1.8 − 0.084𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 − 0.689𝑟𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 − 0.332𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑡 
Final model: 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 = 2.6 − 0.113𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 − 0.495𝑟𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 − 0.05𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑡 
As a robustness check, the performance in several sub-samples was studied and shown in 
Table 4. In every full decade of the studied period, the new model outperforms unrestricted 
momentum considerably, except for 1999 to 2008. The period since 2009 has been the worst 
in history for unrestricted momentum and while it also was for the developed model, the 
latter performed much better, with a Sharpe ratio of 0.40. The last decade was the only period 
in history in which the final model underperforms the market.  
Transaction Costs: 
Finally, one last topic that must be addressed are the trading costs of the strategy (Tables 7 
and 8 provides a summary). These costs have been researched for unrestricted momentum 
and there is no universally accepted agreement on how much they impact the strategy. They 
are composed of trading commissions, taxes, bid-ask spread, and sometimes other costs are 
considered, such as the price impact of the trade. For the purpose of this thesis, a comparison 
between the final developed model (analyzed in the previous sub-section) and the 
unrestricted momentum trading costs was studied. 
First, the turnover of the developed strategy is now 100%, as it is a rule that no stocks that 






average turnover of 33.2% of unrestricted momentum (a value lower than the one found by 
Grundy and Martin (2001), possibly due to different screening and weighting rules).  
With a turnover much higher than unrestricted momentum, the final model must have much 
higher costs. Another important remark is that the strategy and unrestricted momentum only 
include stocks with price higher than $5, meaning that penny stocks are avoided, which are 
known to have higher transaction costs, as for instance, bid-ask spread. 
Finally, the level of round-trip transaction costs that would turn the average returns of the 
strategy insignificantly different than 0 at 95% level of confidence is 2.2% per month, 
compared to 3.2% found for unrestricted momentum. The costs that remove significance 
from the returns of the final strategy are therefore 30% lower than for momentum. 
Furthermore, after costs there would be no significant difference between the returns of the 
model developed and the returns of momentum at a 95% level of confidence if monthly costs 
are higher than 1.1%, which several academics have estimated to be the case.  
Trading costs have a much larger impact on the model and they can easily prevent investors 
from taking advantage of the higher returns. As Grundy and Martin (2001) argue, this does 
not explain the pattern observed but it has important implications for investors, who must be 










The aim of this thesis was to create practices of accounting for other characteristics of stock 
returns in momentum trading, such as reversal trends and volatility control mechanisms, 
improving the already highly satisfactory returns of the strategy. 
To account for the short-term reversal experienced by stocks over a 1-month period after 12 
months of returns continuation trend, stocks which exhibit signs of this feature were excluded 
from the winners/losers portfolios. This version of momentum investing achieves a dramatic 
improvement to the unrestricted strategy, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.08 and a monthly alpha of 
2.6%, creating an even bigger puzzle for financial theory. However, the drawback of the 
model is the significant increase in transaction costs due to a monthly turnover of 100%. 
After monthly costs of 1.1%, there is no significant difference between the returns of 
momentum and the ones of the created model. 
Pursuing the same idea, the exclusion of stocks showing signs of long-term reversal was 
tested. The results are not as encouraging, and this could be explained by the fact that this 
type of reversal happens in a broader period of time, and thus it is more difficult to avoid. 
The risk-parity and the volatility screening approaches used to reduce risk were also not 
effective. The conclusion was drawn that momentum’s risk is due to the interaction between 
the portfolios of losers and winners, and not by the risk of each of them individually. 
As a suggestion for possible research in the future, it would be important to check how this 
new model holds internationally and if it can be combined with other improvements that have 






momentum under normal market circumstances, but it is not effective in doing so under crisis 
periods. Combining the model with the strategy developed by Barroso and Santa-Clara 








































18,0% 17,0% 16,3% 16,7% 16,0% 14,2% 
St. Dev 25,0% 25,0% 22,3% 20,8% 24,0% 23,5% 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
0,72 0,68 0,73 0,80 0,67 0,60 
Kurtosis 3,64 4,11 3,45 4,07 3,35 1,86 
Skewness -0,33 -0,25 -0,46 -0,03 -0,42 -0,33 
       
Average # 
Stocks 
18 34 61 18 66 66 
# Rf uses 0 0 0 24 0 0 
Table 1 – Statistics for Winners portfolios (1929-2016). Excess Return; St. Dev; Sharpe Ratio – annualized. Kurtosis; 




















-13,9% -2,9% -0,9% 0,3% -2,4% -2,2% 
St. Dev 32,9% 38,2% 35,8% 32,7% 35,2% 36,6% 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
-0,42 -0,08 -0,02 0,01 -0,07 -0,06 
Kurtosis 11,13 17,62 17,76 22,42 15,40 13,24 
Skewness 0,99 2,17 1,97 2,03 1,77 1,43 
       
Average # 
Stocks 
13 25 37 15 39 39 
# Rf uses 5 10 0 160 0 0 
Table 2 – Statistics for Losers portfolios (1929-2016). Excess Return; St. Dev; Sharpe Ratio – annualized. Kurtosis; 




























28,6% 16,6% 13,8% 13,1% 15,1% 13,1% 7,3% 
St. Dev 26,5% 30,4% 29,1% 29,5% 26,6% 32,4% 18,7% 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
1,08 0,55 0,48 0,44 0,57 0,40 0,39 
Kurtosis 11,35 25,55 24,01 17,47 21,29 12,64 7,83 
Skewness -0,75 -2,86 -2,65 -1,61 -2,47 -1,72 0,20 
        
% Positive 
Months 
67,01% 63,60% 61,80% 61,04% 63,89% 60,19% 59,53% 
        
Max 
Drawdown 
-84,6% -98,1% -96,5% -95,9% -90,1% -93,8% -83,7% 
1932 -26,8% -66,7% -93,8% -91,9% -80,8% -79,0% -8,4% 
2009 -76,3% -85,4% -86,7% -3,2% -84,9% -78,1% 28,4% 
Table 3 – Statistics for WML portfolios (1929-2016). Excess Return; St. Dev; Sharpe Ratio – annualized. Kurtosis; Skewness 









1929-1938 1,24 0,29 0,09 
1939-1948 1,69 0,82 0,51 
1949-1958 1,75 0,93 1,46 
1959-1968 1,08 0,82 0,64 
1969-1978 1,28 0,74 -0,10 
1979-1988 1,68 0,92 0,46 
1989-1998 1,77 1,60 0,93 
1999-2008 0,41 0,50 -0,17 
2009-2016 0,40 -0,17 1,02 








Table 5 – Fama-French 3 Factor Model (monthly returns) 
 
 
Table 6 – CAPM Model (monthly returns) 
 





(Model – Equal-Weighted) 
Cost 2,20% 3,23% 1,14% 
Average Post-Cost 
Return 
0,46% 0,46% 0,36% 
St. Dev 7,67% 7,70% 5,95% 
St. Error 0,24% 0,24% 0,18% 
Z-Stat 1,96 1,96 1,96 
    
Table 7 – Summary of trading cost that renders the returns insignificant at a 5% confidence level 
 
 
Losers Winners Total 
Equal-Weighted 28,8% 37,6% 33,2% 
Excluding 1m 
Reversal 
100% 100% 100% 
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